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Abstract: This study investigated the roles of four psychosocial variables – anxiety, conscientiousness,
emotional intelligence, and Protestant work ethic – on subjective ratings of cognitive workload as
measured by the Task Load Index (TLX) and the further connections between the four variables and TLX
ratings of task performance. The four variables represented aspects of an underlying construct of
elasticity versus rigidity in response to workload. Participants were 141 undergraduates who
performed a vigilance task under different speeded conditions while working on a jigsaw puzzle for 90
minutes. Regression analysis showed that anxiety and emotional intelligence were the two variables
most proximally related to TLX ratings. TLX ratings contributed to the prediction of performance on the
puzzle, but not the vigilance task. Severity error bias was evident in some of the ratings. Although
working in pairs improved performance, it also resulted in higher ratings of temporal demand and
perceived performance pressure.
Keywords: cognitive workload, NASA task load index (TLX), conscientiousness, anxiety, dual
task, emotional intelligence, group dynamics
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1. Introduction

Several authors have made a cogent case for studying individual differences in
personality, motivation, cognitive abilities, and coping strategies in the study of ergonomics
problems (Baldwin 2009; Cox-Fuenzalida, Swickert, and Hittner 2004; Cox-Fuenzalida et al.
2006; Drury et al. 2009; Eysenck 2010; Guastello, Guastello, and Guastello 2013; Hancock,
Hancock, and Warm 2009; Karwowski 2000; Matthews and Campbell 2009; Szalma 2008;
Szalma and Taylor 2011; Szymura 2010; Verhagen 1993). In principle, such knowledge
could be used to modify system designs so that individual differences no longer present
meaningful variation in performance, to customise designs, and to take advantage of
human capabilities and limitations. The present study is concerned with individual
differences in the experience of cognitive workload as measured by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Task Load Index (TLX).
The second objective of the study was to examine and compare the relationships
between the individual differences with TLX ratings and the individual differences with
actual performance measures. TLX ratings have developed some good currency in
workload studies because they capture psychological responses to workload manipulations
that are not evident in the actual behaviours. People exert effort to maintain their
performance levels in spite of changing environmental demands. It is only when the
environmental demands exceed their abilities to cope that decrements in performance are
observed (Hancock and Warm 1989). Thus the subjective experience of workload precedes
the performance outcomes. There is no reason to assume, however, that individual
differences that influence subjective ratings are always the same as those that correlate
directly with performance. Thus the three-way relationships among individual differences,
subjective ratings, and actual performance require systematic investigation.
Four particular variables were examined in this study in conjunction with research
on cognitive workload. Two of them, anxiety and conscientiousness, originate from
personality trait theories. The other two variables, work ethic and emotional intelligence
(EI), are psychosocial constructs from other origins. The experimental setting studied here
involved a dual-task assignment, one of which was a vigilance task and the other was
assembling a jigsaw puzzle. Performance measures for both tasks were used in conjunction
with the TLX and other research variables. The experiment also had two experimental
manipulations with two conditions each: one was working alone or working in pairs; it was
expected that the presence of other people could affect perceived workload. The other was
a manipulation of work speed on the vigilance task such that some participants worked at
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increasing speeds and the others worked at decreasing speeds. The following sections of
this paper elaborate some theoretical issues in cognitive workload and fatigue, the TLX
form of measurement, the personality and psychosocial variables, and social facilitation.

1.1. Cognitive workload and fatigue

Cognitive workload can be defined as ‘[the] level of attentional resources required
to meet both objective and subjective criteria, which may be mediated by task demands,
external support, and past experience’ (Young and Stanton 2006). Both underload and
overload can tax the individual's adaptive capacities and affect performance when the
capacity limits are exceeded in either direction (Hancock and Warm 1989). Load capacity
is now thought to be moderately flexible (Ralph, Gray, and Schoelles 2010), but it is likely
to become more taxed when two or more tasks demand the same mental resources
(Wickens 2002).

Fatigue is the loss of work capacity over time (Starch and Ash 1917); the same basic
definition applies to physical and mental fatigue. In the case of cognitive fatigue, it has been
challenging to separate workload and fatigue effects (Ackerman 2011; Guastello, Boeh,
Schimmels et al. 2012; Guastello, Boeh, Shumaker et al. 2012; Guastello, Boeh et al. 2013;
Hancock and Desmond 2001; Matthews et al. 2012). Evidence suggests that cognitive
fatigue results from prolonged and significant demands on the executive function within
working memory (Logie 2011), and is a more likely result of work time on a specific mental
task, rather that total work time on a group of mental tasks done in series (Guastello, Boeh,
Schimmels et al. 2012). Switching tasks can alleviate fatigue, although the act of switching
tasks can place additional demands on working memory, particularly if it involves
switching to a more demanding task from a boring one (Alves and Kelsey 2010; Guastello,
Gorin et al. 2012). Time has two effects on workload and fatigue: although work capacity
drops over time and thus reduces observable performance (fatigue), practice, adaptive
responses, and automaticity are working in the other direction over time to improve
performance in some way or lessen the demands of production. The regrouping strategies
could also be applied to the management of cognitive workload.
The response to the nexus of phenomena surrounding cognitive workload and
fatigue was to develop two non-linear dynamical (cusp catastrophe) models, one for
workload and one for fatigue, and an experimental design that tests both models in a given
situation (Guastello, Boeh, Schimmels et al. 2012; Guastello, Boeh, Shumaker et al. 2012;
Guastello, Boeh et al. 2013; Guastello, Malon et al. 2013; Guastello, Shircel et al. 2013).
There are places where individual differences play an important role within each of the two
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models. In the case of workload, individual differences contribute to elasticity or resilience,
which are features of adaptability to changing levels of workload (Guastello 1985) or other
forms of stress (Pincus and Metten 2010). In the case of fatigue, compensatory mental
abilities can support, or dissipate the demand on, the primary resource that fatigues and
results in a performance decline. The notion of compensatory mental abilities is consistent
with what is currently known about working memory capacity being derived from several
intellectual resources and pulled together by the executive function (Kane and Engle 2002;
Logie 2011). Both non-linear models have built-in provisions for situational elements that
promote improvement and decline of performance with adjustments in workload and
elements that mitigate fatigue.

The cusp catastrophe models for cognitive workload and fatigue appear in Figure 1.
The cusp response surface is three-dimensional and describes two stable states of
behaviour. Change between the two states is a function of two control parameters,
asymmetry (a) and bifurcation (b). At low values of b, change is smooth; y is a continuous
monotonic function of a. At high values of b, the relationship between a and y is
discontinuous depending on the values of a. At the lower end of the a scale, y is
unresponsive to changes in a. Something similar occurs at the upper end of the a scale. In
the middle of the a scale, however, y changes suddenly (i.e. catastrophically) as a function
of a.
Figure 1. Cusp catastrophe models for cognitive workload (upper) and fatigue (lower).

At middle values of 𝑎𝑎, changes occur around the upper modes and lower modes;
changes are large between the modes and relatively small within the modes. There are two
thresholds for behaviour change, one ascending and one descending. The phenomenon of
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hysteresis simultaneously refers to relatively frequent changes between two behavioural
states and the two different thresholds for change. The equation for the cusp response
surface can be rendered statistically and tested literally.

Elasticity and its opposite, rigidity, as used here are analogous to a similar construct
in material science. The amount of vertical weight is the asymmetry (a) parameter. A rigid
material will snap if it is stressed too extensively. A more elastic material would show some
signs of bending under increased load, but would revert to its undamaged form or show
less deformity due to stress (Gordon 1978; Guastello 1985; Zeeman 1977). The cognitive
analogy here is that psychological characteristics of rigidity can go a long way toward
minimising the effect of workload or increasing workload, but with the result of a sudden
burst of errors when load exceeds a certain level. More elastic characteristics are likely to
buffer increased load and minimise performance deficits. Elasticity constructs might be
recognised as ‘coping’ or ‘adaptability’; the important feature is that the individual makes
some internal adjustment that could involve reorganising the execution of the task or
responding differently to cues produced from the task experience. The relationship
between workload demand, coping, and performance forms the crux of the dynamic
adaptability model advanced by Hancock and Warm (1989).
Depletion of work capacity caused by fatigue is typically observed as a work curve
that plots performance over time. There is a sharp drop in performance when fatigue sets
in, which is pronounced in vigilance tasks (Hancock 2013). The performance decrement is
coupled with an increase in variability over time (Starch and Ash 1917; Guastello and
McGee 1987). However, not everyone experiences a decline as a result of the same
expenditures. Some show an increase in physical strength akin to ‘just getting warmed up,’
while others show stably high or lower performance levels for the duration of the work
period. The total quantity of work done would be the main contributor to the bifurcation
parameter: If the individual did not accomplish much in a fixed amount of time, there
would be comparably little drain on work capacity. The asymmetry parameter in the
fatigue model would consist of compensatory abilities that assist with the demands placed
on a particular mental resource that is imposed by the task.

Ideally the results supporting a cusp model should show an equal or greater degree
of fit between the data and the model compared to the next best theoretical model, which
was a linear function in the cases of cognitive workload and fatigue tested thus far. The
results should also identify bifurcation and asymmetry variables for the cusps. Because the
models were tested in pairs, it was possible to observe a strong workload effect but a
weaker fatigue effect or vice versa.
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Five experiments on the pair of cusp of models have been completed to date. The
first experiment of the series (𝑁𝑁 = 181) evaluated cognitive workload and fatigue in an
episodic memory task (Guastello, Boeh, Shumaker et al. 2012). The second experiment (N
= 130), which focused on a pictorial memory task (Guastello, Boeh et al. 2012) required
the participants to work alone first and then in competition with another participant under
different conditions for time pressure and incentives; the participants also completed a
brief version of the episodic memory task before and after an hour of work on the main
task. The third experiment (𝑁𝑁 = 105) investigated cognitive workload and fatigue
outcomes for multitasking compared to single tasks in addition to assessing the impact of
voluntary and involuntary task ordering (Guastello, Boeh et al. 2013). The fourth
experiment (𝑁𝑁 = 141) involved a vigilance dual task in which the participants watched a
virtual reality security camera and signalled the presence of an intruder while completing a
jigsaw puzzle; the participants worked either alone or in pairs (Guastello, Malon et al.
2013). The fifth experiment involved optimisation and risk taking in a financial decisionmaking task (Guastello, Shircel et al. 2013).

There were several important findings from the experiments thus far: (1) the cusp
models (unweighted average 𝑅𝑅 2 = .46) were more accurate than the best linear
alternatives (unweighted average 𝑅𝑅 2 = .29) for predicting change in performance as a
function of workload or fatigue. (2) The manipulation of vertical load, which included
incentives for competition, worked as expected as asymmetry variables in the workload
models. (3) Elasticity versus rigidity variables variously included anxiety, frustration, selfdetermined task order versus experiment-driven task order, conscientiousness and selfcontrol, field dependence, and work ethic. (4) In the fatigue models, the measurement of
work done between the starting and ending observations worked as a bifurcation variable
as expected. (5) Compensatory abilities in the fatigue model included arithmetic ability
relative to the episodic memory task, peak memory span relative to the pictorial memory
task, spelling ability relative to the perceptual-motor tasks, and field dependence relative to
the financial decision-making task.
One aspect of the research agenda for the further development of the two non-linear
dynamical models involves the search for variables that would correspond to elasticity
(resilience) or compensatory abilities, and to identify any situational influences that might
affect the relevance of those variables. The present study was motivated by the search for
elasticity constructs pertinent to workload and the further assessment of the relationships
between some candidate variables with the popular, but static, TLX measurements of
subjective workload. Four candidate constructs are described in further detail below.
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1.2. NASA Task Load Index

The TLX is a subjective measure of workload in six domains that represent costs to
the operators who are performing a task: mental demand, physical demand, temporal
demand, performance demand, effort required to meet the performance demand, and
experience of frustration (Hart 1986; Hart and Staveland 1988). The first three domains
are properties of the task and the latter three capture the person's response to the task.
The original method of compiling TLX results was a labour-intensive process. Operators
had to pick which of two of dimensions contributed more to the task; these paired
comparisons were made for all possible pairs of the six dimensions. In addition,
participants rated each domain on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. A workload scale would
then be compiled from the ratings and the weights obtained from the paired comparison
technique (Byers et al. 1988).

One proposed method for simplifying the scoring procedure eliminated the paired
comparisons procedure and only used the sum of the six scales on the original 0–100 scale.
This version was known as the Raw Task Load Index (RTLX). Not surprisingly, studies
(Byers, Bittner, and Hill 1989; Dickinson, Byblow, and Ryan 1993; Noyes and Bruneau
2007) showed that the TLX and RTLX measures of workload produced essentially the same
results, with correlations above .95. Braarud (2001) later reduced the 0–100 scale to a 0–
10 scale, which is consistent with the standard advice for rating scales that a scale with 5–
11 markers is generally sufficient for capturing psychologically meaningful differences in
observation (Leary 2012). The three versions of the TLX scale continue to be employed in
contemporary research (Dey and Mann 2010); the simpler acronym TLX is adopted
throughout this paper with the understanding that some researchers’ procedures could
vary as just described.
The majority of research with the TLX was conducted using a conventional paperand-pencil format. Some researchers, however, experimented with a computer-based
version of TLX. Ideally the two media should produce the same measurements, but
unfortunately, completing the rating scales on a computer produced a higher workload
than the paper-and-pencil format (Noyes and Bruneau 2007). Practically, this result means
the computer medium increases the overall workload the participant subjectively
experienced. It is thus recommended that further research with the TLX should stick with
the traditional method of assessment, which can be completed at a lower cost to the
participants and is thus less intrusive.
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Another methodological issue is the extent to which TLX scores are influenced by
context in which task evaluation is made (Moroney, Biers, and Eggemeier 1995). Taking
the TLX while still in the cockpit may produce different workload results than taking the
test in a classroom safely on the ground (Moroney, Biers, and Eggemeier 1995). Similar to
the context question is the question of order effects for two different tasks or versions of
tasks. For example, suppose Group A experienced harder levels of the same task followed
by easier levels later on. Group B, meanwhile, was exposed to easier levels of the task first
and then finished with the harder level. How would these two groups rate the task overall
on the six dimensions? The earlier research indicated that the TLX was not vulnerable to
order effects (Dickinson, Byblow, and Ryan 1993). The present study did provide a new
opportunity to study order effects on the TLX.

The differences in the TLX scoring methods do not undermine a more important
observation that the measure is sensitive to workload differences as observed in many
contexts (Wierwille and Eggemeier 1993), including both real (Shively et al. 1987) and
simulated flight tasks (Battiste and Bortolussi 1988; Nataupsky and Abbott 1987; Tsang
and Johnson 1989; Vidulich and Bortolussi 1988) and with remote-controlled vehicles
(Byers et al. 1988; Wierwille and Eggemeier 1993). Sensitivity to workload differences has
also been demonstrated with vigilance tasks (Hart 2008; Warm, Dember, and Hancock
1996). Although vigilance tasks seem simple and undemanding at first glance, they produce
high workload scores on the TLX (Temple et al. 2000; Warm, Parasuraman, and Matthews
2008). The TLX was also able to distinguish single- and dual-task conditions (Dey and
Mann 2010), although it could not distinguish between memory and tracking tasks.
Although some studies show a direct relationship between subjective ratings of
workload and task performance, others showed dissociations between the two measures
(Hancock 1996; Oron-Gilad et al. 2008; Yeh and Wickens 1988). According to Yeh and
Wickens, dissociations between workload from the task and performance can occur under
conditions of underload and overload. In the case of underload, increased incentives or
feedback can produce improvements in performance, although the task load itself stays the
same. Later writers have reframed the incentive conditions as actually adding to the
effective load (Guastello, Boeh et al. 2012), although the extent to which the contextual
factors influence TLX ratings of a task is an open question and probably related to the
instructions given to the study participants. In the case of growing overload, operators
expend additional effort up to a point to maintain performance; within this region
workload and performance are dissociated. When load exceeds a critical point, however,
performance drops suddenly; hence performance and workload are re-associated
(Hancock and Warm 1989 Han; Yeh and Wickens 1988).
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TLX–performance relationships can be affected by operators’ skill level. Those with
stronger skills would rate a task lower in load. Those with greater skill would have greater
automaticity in their cognitive processes, and thus a greater flexibility for coping with
increases in workload (Oron-Gilad et al. 2008).
TLX–performance relationships can be affected by feedback from the task and the
different ways in which operators could interpret that feedback. Feedback could refocus
attention on skill development and away from some aspects of the workload (Oron-Gilad
et al. 2008). According to self-efficacy theory, some people would see the gap between
desired and actual performance as a signal to try harder or try differently. Others would
just resign themselves to the present situation and regard the added effort as pointless or
not worth the effort (Bandura and Locke 2003). According to perceptual control theory,
feedback could sustain present performance and a lessening of effort (Vancouver 2005;
Vancouver et al. 2002), and thus reduced TLX workload. This avenue toward complacency
would result in lower performance when the demands increase, but also even when they
do not increase.

The advantages of cognitive automaticity do not necessarily translate into
advantages for using machine automation. Yeh and Wickens (1988) gave an example of a
tracking task that was demanding in its original form, but when it was automated the
cognitive load shifted to executive functions of working memory required to manage the
automated system. Thus the workload–performance relationship in tracking seemed
consistent and reduced, but the load demand shifted to a new aspect of performance.

In summary, the dissociation between workload and performance can result from
several sources including appraisal of one's ability to perform under great load demands,
motivation to invest effort, influences from the environment that are non-central to a
particular task, the composition of cognitive and psychomotor resources contributing to
workload, the tendency to maintain stability of performance under increased load
conditions to the extent possible, and individual differences in how all these aspects are
interpreted by an individual. Thus the present study was designed to explore the
connection between some individual differences in elasticity–rigidity and TLX and the
relationship between both groups of variables and performance.

1.3. Anxiety

Clinically, anxiety is often characterised as an irrational fear, but it could also
originate from apprehension about genuine threats from the environment (Eysenck 1997;
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Zeidner and Matthews 2011). It does, however, involve a modicum of arousal to the
sympathetic nervous system. Anxiety presents with a variety of pathological conditions.
Anxiety is often manifest as psychosomatic symptoms (Taylor 1953) – shaking arms and
legs, nightmares, cold perspiration, eating and sleeping disruptions, diarrhoea or
constipation, headaches, nausea – that as a group do not go together medically. If a person
exhibits too many of the symptoms, then anxiety is concluded rather than, say, medical
syndromes involving headaches, vision, or digestive track issues. Anxiety can result from
the individual's personal level of adjustment or prolonged exposures to stress, although it
is understood that stress itself does not affect all people the same way even if it were
severe; individual coping strategies can be very effective.
Anxiety is often observed or experienced as a consequence of job stress. Job
stressors variously include workload and time pressure, stressors with social origins such
as job insecurity, or those with physical origins such as noise, heat, cold, shift work, and
physical danger sources (Quick, Murphy, and Hurrell 1992). It could be transient, arriving
and disappearing as the stress sources come and go, or it could be a longer term effect.
Longer term effects might reflect personality traits, but could also reflect long-term job
exposures, particularly if anxiety levels are widespread in the work group.

Anxiety can act on some, but not necessarily all, stages of cognitive processing
(Zeidner and Matthews 2011). Tasks can be expected to differ regarding which stages of
processing are most susceptible to disruptions from anxiety. Anxiety can also lead to
behavioural disruption such as when a person is properly engaged in a task, but anxiety
intrudes and disrupts the behaviour sequence. The interruption could be acute in the sense
of dropping everything to make a quick exit from the task, perhaps to respond to a
distraction, or hesitating at a critical moment and causing an error (Leary 1990; Murphy,
DuBois, and Hurrell 1986).
Anxiety could be positively related to performance in some contexts, however, if
there is a need to detect danger signals (Ein-Dor et al. 2010). More anxious people would
tend toward a lower threshold to respond. A related interpretation is that anxious people
engage in compensatory efforts to maintain performance goals, which would seem to apply
to a broad range of tasks (Matthews et al. 2000; Szalma 2008). According to Vytal et al.
(2012), however, anxiety is more likely to have a negative effect on performance if
workload is low because the opportunities for ruminations are greater, but higher
cognitive demands suppress the effects of anxiety.
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Anxiety was tested as an elasticity (rigidity) variable in a recent cognitive workload
and fatigue study (Guastello, Boeh, Shumaker et al. 2012) in which the participants
performed an episodic memory task that had automatically increased load as the
participant proceeded; it did not make the intended contribution to the model. It did work
as an elasticity variable, however, in a different type of memory task, in which the
participants competed against other participants for extra class credits (Guastello, Boeh,
Schimmels et al. 2012). Anxiety also showed a similar dynamical impact on individual
accident involvements in a manufacturing setting, such that people reporting higher levels
of anxiety had experienced notably more or fewer accidents than others, given the same
range of hazard exposures (Guastello 2003; Guastello and Lynn, forthcoming). Anxiety thus
acted as a source of rigidity; at low to moderate hazard levels it had a positive effect on
safety, perhaps because of the increased effort expended in scanning the environment. At
the highest levels of hazard, however, its effect was negative probably for the same reason:
too much scanning and deliberating and not enough immediate adaptive action. The
foregoing results suggest that the effects of anxiety depend on situational constraints and
may be social in origin, at least in part, as Leary and Kowalski (1995) suggested.
Anxiety is a facet of the broader personality trait neuroticism, which includes
emotional stability and reactivity (Costa and McCrae 1992). Cox-Fuenzalida et al. (2004)
assessed the role of neuroticism in response to increasing or decreasing workloads in an
auditory vigilance task. Participants who were higher in neuroticism showed longer
response times in both conditions and more errors in the condition where speed increased.
In addition to the explanations for the anxiety–performance relationships already given,
anxious people appear to cope less effectively with increased demands. Workload levels
are discussed further in Section 1.8.
Szalma and Taylor (2011) constructed a vigilance task where participants worked
under different combinations of automation levels (machine versus manual control) and
reliability of automation. Five factor model (FFM) traits were not consistently related to
performance or TLX ratings across all conditions, but neuroticism was correlated with
perceived temporal demands in one of the more challenging combinations of automation
and reliability. Rose et al. (2002) found neuroticism correlated with perceived frustration
in a vigilance task.

1.4. Conscientiousness

Conscientiousness is a personality trait whereby someone with a high score would

be attentive to details in their work and daily life, adherent to rules and regulations, and
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would do their best to complete a job properly (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka 1970). Defined
in this fashion it is a primary trait in the context of the 16 Personality Factors
Questionnaire (16PF). The personality construct of the same name from the Five-Factor
Model includes the foregoing definition plus another primary trait, self-controlled versus
uncontrolled or impulsive (Conn and Rieke 1994). The research evidence now suggests
that the primary and more narrowly defined traits are more closely linked to task
performance than the broader traits (Dudley et al. 2006; Guastello et al. 2013; Szymura
2010).

The definition of conscientiousness suggests that it would be relevant to a wide
range of jobs and tasks. This point is basically true (Meyer, Dalal, and Bonaccio 2009),
although some researchers have found that conscientiousness only has a positive impact on
performance when the overall emotional climate of the workplace is positive, and could be
negative otherwise (Byrne et al. 2005; Meyer, Dalal, and Bonaccio 2009). Others have
reported that there could be limits to the effectiveness of conscientiousness in some
circumstances, such that there is an optimal level for performance, but very high scores
could be counterproductive; in Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka's (1970) taxonomy, the opposite
of conscientiousness is expedience which places value on getting things done in a
reasonable amount of time.
People scoring higher in conscientiousness are capable of focusing their attention to
a greater extent than others; this attribute has been characterised as ‘rigidity’ (MacLean
and Arnell 2010). It would follow that conscientiousness could act as a source of rigidity in
workload studies as well, such that the performance of the conscientious person would be
less negatively affected by stressors from the task, at least up to a critical point at which
their error rates would be greater than those of others. Impulsivity, in contrast, denotes an
element of elasticity and spontaneity in response to unplanned events. Research that
specifically connected conscientiousness to vigilance tasks showed that conscientious
participants were more sensitive to the visual targets and made fewer false alarms than
others (Rose et al. 2002). In another situation, conscientious participants reported greater
workload ratings for a challenging combination of automation and automation reliability
than other participants, and lower ratings of workload than others for a less challenging
combination (Szalma and Taylor 2011). The present study investigated whether
conscientiousness would be reflected in the TLX ratings, particularly for performance
pressure and effort.
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1.5. Work ethic

The Protestant work ethic (PWE) is a work value, or set of beliefs about work, that
emphasises independent action and an obligation to work (Buchholz 1977; Furnham
1990). A person who endorses the work ethic would agree with statements that emphasise
independent action and obligation to work such as ‘work is good regardless of how hard or
boring it is’ and ‘a person should avoid dependence on others.’ They are likely to maintain
effort on boring or tedious tasks (Greenberg 1977).

There was a time when PWE was the dominant belief system in western culture,
particularly in the USA, but concerns were raised in the late 1970s that it was no longer the
dominant belief system (Buchholz 1977). Alternative belief systems would be the
humanistic system (‘work should be meaningful’), the Marxist exploitive system
(‘management exploits workers’), the Marxist participative system (‘workers should have a
voice in decisions’), and the leisure system (‘work is necessary to live, but real life exists
outside the work place’). PWE still exists, nonetheless, particularly its aspect of
independence when it is combined with other beliefs about free will (Stillman et al. 2010).
In the case of workload studies, PWE could reasonably have the same relationship to
performance as conscientiousness and might also affect TLX ratings for the same reason.

1.6. Emotional intelligence

Salovey and Mayer (1990) introduced the concept of EI as ‘a type of emotional
information processing that includes accurate appraisal of emotions in oneself and others,
appropriate expression of emotion, and adaptive regulation in such a way as to enhance
living’ (Mayer 2001). Mayer and Salovey (1997) refined the definition to reflect more
strongly that EI was the ability ‘to perceive accurately, appraise, and express emotion; the
ability to access and/or generate feelings when they facilitate thought; the ability to
understand emotion and emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to
promote emotional and intellectual growth’ (Mayer 2001). The two definitions promoted
different measurement models, some of which emphasised the cognitive aspect of EI, while
others emphasised personality aspects of EI (Cherniss 2010).
Although EI was touted as a very promising construct for personnel selection, some
researchers reported difficulty finding any predictive value in it beyond what was
accounted for by general intelligence and conscientiousness (Amelang and Steinmayr
2006). Others found evidence that it moderated the relationship between
conscientiousness and work performance such that conscientiousness positively predicts
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work performance if EI is also high, and negatively predicts performance otherwise
(Douglas, Frink, and Ferris 2004). A later meta-analysis, however, reported generalisable
correlations between .24 and .30 between EI and work performance, noting that the better
results came from personality-based measures rather than cognitive ability measures
(O’Boyle et al. 2011).
If high workload is producing high stress and the potential for emotional reactions,
people with higher EI should have the ability to detect those reactions and mitigate the
situation effectively (Thompson 2010). Thompson also invoked the cusp model for
workload with its elasticity–rigidity construct as part of his exposition. Low EI was
associated with rigidity. Although indifference to one's own emotions may facilitate focus
of attention instead of distractibility, the indifference to one's own stress reactions is an
important reason why smart people make catastrophically bad decisions, according to
Thompson. Rigidity can buffer against performance variation when workload is low to
moderate, but can lead to catastrophic failure when workload is high. The role of EI might
only be important in high-stress jobs or jobs where a substantial amount of emotional
labour is involved, according to Joseph and Newman (2010).

The measurement model adopted in the present study was the version by Schutte
et al. (1998), which is a personality-based construct that captures the ability to interpret
one's emotions and responsiveness to the emotions of others. Schutte et al.'s measure was
also conveniently brief for a study that involved measuring a number of variables, a core
task that was meant to be time consuming, and time constraints on the participants’
availability. Although it was expected that EI could influence TLX ratings of a given
situation, it was not easy to say a priori whether EI would result in lower TLX ratings
because the individual was more comfortable handling the demands or higher ratings
because the individual was more sensitive to what was taking place. Thus in the present
experiment, knowledge of one's own emotions and the regulation thereof are intrinsic to
working alone or with other people. Recognition of co-workers’ states and response
thereto should facilitate collective efforts.

1.7. Group effects

Another unresolved problem in cognitive workload research is that the research
situations typically involve observations of or from individuals who are working alone. The
question was raised (Funke et al. 2012), however, about how to calibrate workload for an
entire team. Although researchers use standard physiological and subjective measures,
there is no consensus about how to combine them within a team. Group dynamic processes
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are inevitably involved in addition to the sum of the loads on individuals (Cooke et al. 2012;
Stevens et al. 2013). People switch tasks, cover for each other, and coordinate. Although
these cooperative behaviours are usually expected to produce positive effects on
performance, sometimes the opposite occurs (Barnes et al. 2008; Stachowski, Kaplan, and
Waller 2009). The presence of others, the depth of the interactions among participants on
the task, the complexity of the task, and evaluation apprehension can have positive,
negative, or interactive effects on group performance (Bond and Titus 1983; Hertel, Kerr,
and Messé 2000). For problem-solving groups, the group performance is better than the
most competent individual only about half of the time (Shepperd 1993). The group is more
likely to perform better when there is a critical mass of people to contribute (Dennis and
Valacich 1993; Guastello 2010). In addition, the effects of anxiety on performance are more
likely to be visible when the individual is performing in front of an audience or working
with other people interactively, particularly if some sort of evaluation were involved
(Leary and Kowalski 1995).
This study thus included experimental conditions whereby people worked alone or
in pairs. This difference could lower the TLX ratings for workload under the principle that
‘many hands make light the work.’ On the other hand it could increase TLX ratings if
working with another person added a new source of stress.

1.8. Effect of speed

The effect of speed stress is related to load in that load and speed interact to
produce increases in errors (Conrad 1951). The speed–accuracy trade-off is also well
known (Kantowitz and Sorkin 1983; Szalma and Teo 2012). Increases in work speed (but
not load per se) generally do not produce increases in errors until the speed demand
reaches a critical point, after which errors increase suddenly. This basic rule is mitigated to
some extent by other properties of the task. In a vigilance task the rate of target events has
a substantial impact on performance (Warm and Jerison 1984). In this study, however, the
target event rate was held constant, but the speed of changing stimuli with and without
targets was increased or decreased to manipulate speed stress. In a study conducted in
parallel to the present one (Guastello, Malon et al. 2013), speeding up across three
different stimulus rates produced more miss errors overall than slowing down over the
same three rates. Cox-Fuenzalida et al. (2004) found a similar result for participants with
high neuroticism. Thus the speed change manipulation was expected to produce changes in
TLX ratings as well, particularly ratings of temporal demand.
Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2015): pg. 20-52. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Taylor & Francis.

15

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be accessed by following the
link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

1.9. Hypotheses

The hypotheses were that anxiety, conscientiousness, PWE, EI, and the experimental
manipulation of working alone versus working in pairs would all be correlated with some
of the TLX scales, and both groups of variables would explain performance on the two tasks
to some extent.

1. The experimental manipulation of working alone or in pairs would affect TLX
ratings and performance in either a positive or negative direction. The experimental
conditions of working alone or in pairs were tested as a dummy-coded variable in a
regression analysis.
2. The experimental manipulation of speeding up or slowing down would affect TLX
ratings and performance such that speeding up would result in higher workload
ratings. This pair of experimental conditions was also tested as a dummy-coded
variable in a regression analysis.
3. Anxiety, conscientiousness, work ethic, and EI would account for unique portions of
the variance in TLX ratings. The extant literature does not provide a clear indication
of how these variables would combine to produce positive or negative regression
weights.
4. The foregoing variables were competitively tested for their ability to explain
performance on the vigilance task and the secondary task.
5. The measure of conscientiousness that was used for testing the second and third
hypotheses was separated into two contributing facets; one was a narrower
definition of conscientiousness that was more consistent with the 16PF scale of the
same name (factor G; Cattell 1994; Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka 1970) and the other
was impulsivity versus control, which was similar to 16PF factor Q3 (Cattell 1994;
Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka 1970). The analytic strategy adopted here was to first
assess the role of conscientiousness in the broader definition of the Five-Factor
Model, and then separate the construct into the two narrower constructs to
determine if doing so would produce different results.
6. In light of previous research showing that the effects of anxiety often take shape in
threatening conditions or in uncertain interactions with other people, interaction
effects were tested for anxiety with working alone or in pairs. Both performance and
TLX ratings were used as dependent measures.
7. Inasmuch as the construct of EI emphasises effective interactions with other people,
interaction effects were tested for the combination of EI and working alone or in
pairs. Again, both performance and TLX ratings were used as dependent measures.
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2. Method

2.1. Participants and tasks

Participants were 141 undergraduates, aged 18–22, who were enrolled in
psychology courses, of whom 40% were male. Participants performed the experimental
tasks individually or in pairs; there were 47 individuals and 47 pairs that produced an
effective n of 94. Participants completed two timed tests and an untimed questionnaire
totalling 25 minutes before performing the main experimental task. The timed tests were
not involved in the present study and are not discussed further.

The main experimental task was to monitor a computer screen with a 33-cm
diagonal monitor while completing a 300-piece jigsaw puzzle. Participants were seated at a
table 2.0 m long and 0.9 m wide. They were initially positioned in the location shown in
Figure 2, and usually stayed there, although they were not prohibited from moving about
or from using all the table space to work on the puzzle. The bell started in the position
shown in Figure 1, but they were not prohibited from moving it around.
Figure 2. Workspace layout for vigilance and puzzle tasks.

Participants were given the following instructions at the beginning of their
experimental session:

In this experiment you will be completing a couple timed tests, an untimed
questionnaire, and the central experimental tasks. The two central tasks are done
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simultaneously: You will complete a jigsaw puzzle while watching a security camera
video on the computer screen. Let's look at a demo version of the security cam
video.

The next instruction was part of the demo: ‘You’ll see empty rooms most of the time,
but occasionally you’ll see people running through the room apparently up to no good.
When you see intruders running through, ring the bell.’ The spoken narrative continued:
‘Meanwhile, your other goal is to complete as much of the puzzle as possible in the time
allotted.’
Further instructions were given to those who were working in pairs: ‘You should
both be responsible for completing the puzzle and monitoring intruders.’ This instruction
was intended to deter them from separating the two tasks so that one only watched the
screen and the other assembled the puzzle. They were not given any limitation about
talking or how to work together. Some pairs did not talk. Some pairs kept their talk task
related and made clear indications that they were performing both tasks together as
instructed. Some pairs kept their conversation running for most of the work period on both
task-related and unrelated topics.

The screen program was produced with Steam virtual reality software (Valve
Corporation 2011). It showed scenes from seven rooms in an office building environment
in rotation. The target images consisted of a character that was designed to appear
dangerous. The target character could appear in any of the seven virtual rooms, and he was
in motion when he appeared. Still frames of a non-target scene and a target scene appear in
Figure 3. The rooms were displayed singly, full screen, in three blocks of 30 minutes each at
2 screens/min, 4 screens/min, and 8 screens/min. Targets appeared on the screen at
random intervals of 1–7 seconds. Targets appeared in 10% of the scenes in each of the
three speed conditions. The target trials were randomly distributed through the blocks of
trials. Participants rang a desk bell when they saw a target.
Figure 3. Still frames from vigilance program with and without an intruder.
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Approximately half of the experimental sessions were prepared with the slow
condition first and followed by the medium speed condition and the fast speed condition.
The other half was prepared with the fast condition first, followed by medium and slow
conditions. Prior to the data collection, participants were given a brief instruction
regarding the nature of the task, examples of intruders, and when to ring the bell. An
experimenter who was in the room followed a script that listed the time of the appearance
of target and non-target screens. When the bell rang, the experimenter recorded a correct
hit, a miss, or a false alarm. The latter two indices were used in the experimental analysis
here.
The puzzle was a realistic-style image of a red fox in the foreground on snowy
terrain and a European town with eighteenth-century architecture in the background. The
picture of the image that appeared on the puzzle box cover remained available to the
participants while working on the puzzle. A second puzzle depicting the solar system, also
300 pieces, was available in case a participant or pair of participants actually finished the
fox puzzle.

2.2. Measurements

Before proceeding to the main tasks, participants completed a 5-minute timed test
of arithmetic ability, a 5-minute timed test of spelling ability, and an untimed survey
instrument measuring anxiety, conscientiousness, PWE, and EI. The same versions of
arithmetic and spelling tests were used in prior studies on cognitive workload and fatigue
(Guastello, Boeh et al. 2012; Guastello, Boeh et al. 2013). Because they did not have any
impact on the analyses in this study, they are not described further here.

The anxiety test was a variation of Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor 1953) that
was used in earlier research on cognitive workload and fatigue (Guastello, Boeh, Schimmels
et al. 2012; Guastello, Boeh, Shumaker et al. 2012; Guastello, Boeh et al. 2013). It consisted
of 19 statements such as ‘I have nightmares about my job or classes.’ The participant
responded by checking ‘agree’ (2 points), ‘?’ (meaning ‘unsure’ or ‘do not know,’ 1 point),
or ‘disagree’ (0 points). Some items were reverse scored. Reliability was assessed with
Cronbach's alpha for international consistency. The α value was .75 in the earlier study
and .64 in this study; some of the symptoms apparently had more variance in the previous
sample than they did in the present sample.
The PWE scale consisted of nine items from Buchholz (1977) to which the
participant responded by checking ‘strongly disagree’ = 1, ‘disagree’ = 2, ‘?’ (meaning
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‘unsure’ or ‘do not know’) = 3, ‘agree’ = 4, or ‘strongly agree’ = 5. An example item was the
following: ‘A person must depend on himself to get ahead.’ Some items were reverse
scored. (α = .50).

The EI scale was the 33-item scale developed by Schutte et al. (1998). The
participants responded using the same five-point Likert scale that was used for PWE, and
some items were reverse scored here as well (α = .82). An example item was the following:
‘When I am faced with obstacles, I remember times when I faced similar obstacles and
overcame them.’
Conscientiousness was composed of 20 items drawn from the International
Personality Item Pool (Goldberg 2011). The items represented the narrower (surface or
primary trait) concept of conscientiousness, such as ‘I push myself very hard to succeed,’
and the impulsivity component that is part of the broader definition of the construct, such
as ‘I do things without thinking of the consequences.’ The participants responded using the
same five-point Likert scale that was used for PWE, and some items were reverse scored
here as well (α = .84).
After the main tasks, the participants completed the TLX ratings using a paper-andpencil format and a 21-point rating scale (NASA Ames Research Center, n.d.). Scales were
anchored as 1 = ‘very low’ and 21 = ‘very high.’
The experimental condition for working alone or in pairs was used as a
dichotomous variable in the statistical analysis. Similarly, the experimental condition for
working at the slow speed first versus fast speed first was used as another dichotomous
variable.

There was a dependent measure for performance on each task. The score on the
security camera task was the sum of three rates of miss errors across the three speed
conditions. The total scores could thus range from 0.00 to 3.00. Because false alarms rates
were very low and non-existent for most participants, false alarms were not analysed here.
Summing the rates gave equal weight to the three speed conditions.
Performance on the puzzle was measured as the total number of pieces assembled
by the end of the 90-minute period. Aggregates of four pieces that were assembled in
addition to the main part of the puzzle completion were treated as ‘assembled.’
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2.3. Analyses

Stepwise multiple regression was used to test hypotheses 1–5 connecting the four
elasticity variables and two experimental manipulations with TLX scales. In addition,
stepwise multiple regression analyses were used to test anxiety, conscientiousness, EI,
PWE, the two experimental conditions, and the TLX scales competitively for their ability to
predict performance on each task.

The choice of forward, backward, or stepwise analyses involves a trade-off between
including an extraneous variable in the model (type I error), missing a variable that could
be highly correlated with another variable that is included in the model (type II error),
statistical power associated with individual weights, and the generalisability of R and the
final model (Babyak 2004; Darlington 1990; Derkson and Kelseman 1992; Thompson
1995). The generalisability of the final model depends on the number of variables in the
model (fewer is better), sample size (larger is better), and sampling differences between
the calibration model and new samples to which one wants to generalise.

The rules of thumb for determining appropriate sample sizes, 7–10 cases per
variable, appear to be well reasoned (Green 1991; Babyak 2004). For the models used here
with TLX variables criteria, which used seven predictors, the cases/variables ratio is 18:1
prior to analysis (cf. Cohen 1990), after discounting cases with missing data. For the
models with performance criteria and TLX scales included as predictors, the
cases/variables ratio is 9.8 prior to analysis. The multiple regression results, reported
below, did not contain more than five variables; the cases/variables ratio after the fact was
31.8.

It is important to recognise that the study was not a data mining exercise. All
variables had theoretical relevance, and discerning their relative importance with respect
to various criteria was meaningful. If any were left out of a multiple regression model
because of multicollinearity with another variable, rather than simple inability to correlate,
it would be possible to detect those conditions with the bivariate correlations that are also
presented.

In a subsequent set of analyses for hypothesis 6, conscientiousness was separated
into two constructs to determine if doing so would produce different results. There were
two possible strategies for separating sub-constructs or facets within conscientiousness.
One is to use factor analysis and separate them empirically if possible. The alternative
would require the experimenters to separate the questionnaire items based on judgements
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of item content. The facets that are usually associated with the FFM were produced in this
fashion (Cattell and Mead 2008).

An attempt to separate conscientiousness through factor analysis did not produce
useful results. The principal axis factoring method produced four factors with an initial 𝜆𝜆 >
1.0. Two of the factors showed 𝜆𝜆 > 1.0 after rotation using the direct oblimin method.
Principal axis factoring was used instead of components analysis to avoid an overly large
first factor that included all or most items. Oblique rotation was used because in theory
primary traits are independent but somewhat correlated (Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka
1970).
The factor analysis was regrettably unsuccessful because all items displayed their
highest loadings on the first factor. Attempts to interpret the other factors (with loadings
greater than .30) did not produce a construct resembling impulsivity. As a result, the items
were separated into two groups based on judgements of the item content; one group
contained impulsivity items and the others were aggregated into a more restricted
construct of conscientiousness. The latter were labelled ‘primary conscientiousness’ for
present purposes. The impulsivity items were as follows: ‘I often leave a mess in my room.’
‘I do things without thinking of the consequences.’ ‘I make plans and stick to them.’ ‘I prefer
to just let things happen.’ ‘I continue until everything is perfect.’ ‘I do things according to a
plan.’ The impulsivity items were keyed so that high scores represented control and low
scores represented impulsivity. The correlation between the two constructs was .70 (p
< .001).
The analyses just described do not test the elasticity principle explicitly. To do so,
the mathematical models shown in Figure 1 and a specific form of analysis would be
required along with behavioural indicators of workload and behavioural outcomes that are
measured at two or more points in time (Guastello 2011, 2013). The use of the two cusp
catastrophe models would also allow for the separation of workload and fatigue effects,
which are potentially conflated in the TLX scales the way they are usually used.
The interaction hypotheses were tested through multiple regression. The
interaction terms were composed by dividing each contributing variable by its standard
deviation before multiplying the two together. This procedure eliminates biasing the
interaction effect by the variable with the larger standard deviation (Evans 1991).
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3. Results

Descriptive statistics for the research variables appear in Table 1. Bivariate
correlations among the psychosocial variables are given in Table 2. Anxiety was not
correlated with conscientiousness, which was consistent with the factorial independence
between the two constructs that is now a widespread result in personality theory and
research. However, anxiety was unexpectedly correlated with PWE such that PWE was
higher among anxious people; it had previously seemed more likely that PWE would be
correlated with conscientiousness instead. EI was significantly correlated with
conscientiousness and PWE.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

Variable
Anxiety
Conscientiousness
Work ethic
Emotional intelligence
TLX ratings
Mental demand
Physical demand
Temporal demand
Performance
Effort
Frustration
Performance
Sum of miss error rates
Puzzle pieces assembled

Maximum
26.11
91.00
34.00
162.00

11.51
69.33
26.10
128.02

5.71
10.29
3.57
11.43

0.00
8.00

2.40
359.00

0.76
181.36

0.43
67.86

1.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
1.00

Table 2. Correlations among psychosocial variables.

(1) Anxiety
(2) Conscientiousness
(3) Emotional intelligence
(4) Work ethic

M

Minimum
2.00
39.00
17.00
90.00

21.00
18.00
20.00
19.00
21.00
21.00

−.12

2

13.62
3.52
10.94
11.54
13.36
11.16

−.13
.34***

3

SD

3.96
3.10
4.68
3.82
3.94
5.38

.26**
.07
.20**

4

Bivariate correlations among the TLX measurements appear in Table 3. Most scales
were correlated with most other scales. This result is consistent with the use of TLX as a
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single measurement in some past research (Byers, Bittner, and Hill 1989; Dey and Mann
2010; Dickinson, Byblow, and Ryan 1993; Noyes and Bruneau 2007).
Table 3. Correlations among TLX scales.
(1) Mental
(2) Physical
(3) Temporal

2

.22**

(4) Performance
(5) Effort
(6) Frustration

3

4

.42***
.33***

.08
.18
.31***

5

.27***
.11
.37***
.24**

6

.34***
.27***
.38***
−.04
.12

3.1. Individual difference in TLX ratings

Bivariate correlations among the TLX scales and psychosocial variables appear in
Table 4. Anxiety was positively correlated with temporal demand and frustration. EI was
positively correlated with performance demand and effort. PWE was positively correlated
with frustration. Conscientiousness was not correlated with any of the TLX scales.
Table 4. Correlations between TLX and psychosocial variables.
Mental
Physical

Temporal
Performance
Effort
Frustration

Anxiety
Conscientiousness
.11
.11
.08
−.10
.18*
.03
.15
.22*

.08
.16
.01
.03

.15
.03

Emotional intelligence

.12
.30***
.23**
.01

Work ethic
.05
.05
.09
.08
.14
.17*

The multiple regression model for mental demand predicted by the four
psychosocial variables and two experimental conditions contained only one significant
correlate, which was EI (𝑟𝑟 = .18; 𝑟𝑟 2 = .03, 𝑡𝑡 = 1.99, 𝑝𝑝 < .05, N = 127). The difference
between this result and the smaller correlation in Table 4 was produced by the listwise
deletion of seven cases containing missing data in the multiple regression analysis.

None of the predictors entered the regression equation for physical demands.
However, two variables entered the equation predicting temporal demand (𝑅𝑅 = .33, 𝑅𝑅 2 =
.11, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎. 𝑅𝑅 2 = .09; 𝐹𝐹(2, 124) = 7.455, 𝑝𝑝 < .001). People who worked in pairs and who
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were scored higher in anxiety reported greater temporal demand. The tests on the beta
weights for the multiple regression analyses appear in Table 5.

Table 5. Multiple regression results for TLX, personality and psychosocial variables, and performance.
Independent
β
t
Dependent: TLX temporal demands

Working in pairs
Anxiety
Dependent: TLX performance pressure
Emotional intelligence
Working in pairs

0.25
0.21

2.93**
2.47*

Task speed presented first
Dependent: puzzle pieces
Working in pairs
TLX performance pressure
Work ethic

0.23

−0.22

2.74**

Dependent: TLX perceived effort
Emotional intelligence

TLX physical demands
Dependent: total security camera misses
Working in pairs
Work ethic

Conscientiousness

0.29
0.28

0.41
0.40
−0.16
−0.14
−0.25
0.20

−0.16

3.56***
3.41***
−2.53*

5.73***
5.52***
−2.38*
−2.06*

−3.07**
2.48*

1.92.a

People who gave higher ratings of performance pressure of the tasks scored higher
in EI and also worked in pairs (R = .41, R2 = .16, adj. R2 = .15; F(2, 125) = 12.25, p < .001).
People who reported greater effort demands of the tasks also scored higher in EI and were
in the experimental condition where the vigilance task started with the camera frames
changing slowly with a concomitantly low absolute number of intruders and then
progressed to frames changing faster (R = .32, R2 = .10, adj. R2 = .09; F(1, 125) = 7.24, p
< .001). Only one variable entered the equation predicting frustration, which was anxiety
(r = .23, r2 = .05, t = 2.60, p < .05).

3.2. Prediction of performance

The bivariate correlation between total errors on the vigilance task and the puzzle
was −.18 (p < .05), indicating that people who accomplished more of the puzzle also made
fewer errors on the vigilance task. None of the TLX scales were correlated with
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performance on the vigilance task (Table 6). PWE was the only other variable in the set
that was correlated with vigilance errors; people scoring high on PWE made more miss
errors.
Table 6. Correlations between TLX and psychosocial variables with performance.
Puzzle
Total vigilance miss errors
Mental

−.03

.06

Physical

−.10

.05

Temporal

.21*

.05

Performance

.47***

−.11

Effort

.12

.08

Frustration

−.10

.09

Anxiety

−.04

.01

Conscientiousness

.20*

−.17

Emotional intelligence

.18*

.05

Work ethic

−.15

.20**

However, the multiple regression model (Table 5) predicting vigilance errors
contained three significant effects: working alone, PWE, and conscientiousness (R = .37, R2
= .14, adj. R2 = .12, F(3, 132) = 7.03, p < .001). The majority of the prediction was afforded
by working alone (10%); the latter two variables accounted for only 4% of the variance in
vigilance errors.

The multiple regression model (Table 5) predicting puzzle completion contained
four significant effects (R = .66, R2 = .44, adj. R2 = .42, F(4, 122) = 23.97, p < .001). Once
again the majority of the prediction was afforded by working alone (28%), followed by TLX
performance (11%), PWE (3%), and TLX physical demands (2%). Physical demands
appeared to be a suppressor effect. The tasks were clearly not physically demanding and
the mean score for physical demands was much lower than the means for other TLX
ratings. Some people did give ratings on physical demands as high as 18.

3.3. Separation of conscientiousness constructs

Table 7 lists the bivariate correlations between the TLX scales and performance
measures with conscientiousness, primary conscientiousness, and impulsivity versus
control. The correlations for total miss errors in the vigilance task, puzzle completion, and
temporal demands increased slightly when the impulsivity facet was removed. The
correlation for temporal demands with impulsivity was significant (r = .18, p < .05),
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indicating that the people who were more controlled perceived greater temporal demand
in the situation.

Table 7. Correlations between TLX and performance variables with conscientiousness scales.
Conscientiousness
Primary conscientiousness
Impulsivity (control)
Security camera misses

−.17

−.18*

−.11

Effort
Frustration

.01
.03

.03
.01

−.00
.03

Puzzle completion
Mental
Physical
Temporal
Performance

.20*
.11
−.10
.08
.16

.21*
.09
−.10
.01
.18*

.10
.12
−.06
.18*
.07

The multiple regression models for the four measures were re-analysed. The results
for total misses in the vigilance task were a bit stronger when primary conscientiousness
replaced the global construct (R = .41, R2 = .16, adj. R2 = .14, F(3, 124) = 8.13, p < .001),
but otherwise did not change dramatically. The results appear in Table 8. The results for
puzzle completion and performance demands did not change and are thus not reported
further.
Table 8. Re-analysis of multiple regression models with primary conscientiousness and impulsivity as
independent variables.
Independent
β
t
Dependent: total security camera misses
Working in pairs
Work ethic
Primary conscientiousness
Dependent: TLX temporal demands
Working in pairs
Anxiety
Impulsivity (control)
Primary conscientiousness
Emotional intelligence

−.287
.217
−.182
.286
.233
.422
−.362
.216

−3.467***
2.594*
−2.164*
3.529***
2.886**
3.724***
−2.981**
2.483*

However, the new results for temporal demands were interesting. Both primary
conscientiousness and impulsivity entered the stepwise solution. However, the beta
weights were in opposite directions such that people who perceived greater temporal
demands were more controlled and scored lower on the primary conscientiousness
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subscale. The latter was functioning as a suppressor variable because it did not show a
significant bivariate correlation with the criterion. In addition, EI entered the model on the
last step; those with higher EI scores perceived greater temporal demand. The revised
model for temporal demands was more accurate overall, accounting for an additional 11%
of the criterion variance (R = .47, R2 = .22, adj. R2 = .19, F(5, 122) = 6.91, p < .001).

3.4. Interaction effects

No interaction effect was found for anxiety and working in pairs with miss errors on
the security camera (R = .30, R2 = .09, adj. R2 = .07, F(3, 135) = 4.58, p < .01), puzzle
completion (R = .541, R2 = .29, adj. R2 = .28, F(3, 134) = 18.48, p < .001), mental demand
(R = .13, R2 = .02, adj. R2 = .00, F(3, 135) = 0. 74, NS), physical demand (R = .08, R2 = .01,
adj. R2 = .00, F(3, 135) = 0.264, NS), temporal demand (R = .32, R2 = .10, adj. R2 = .08, F(3,
135) = 4.97, p < .01), performance demand (R = .28, R2 = .08, adj. R2 = .06, F(3, 135) =
3.08, p < .05), or frustration (R = .24, R2 = .06, adj. R2 = .04, F(3, 135) = 2.73, p < .05).
However, there was a small effect for effort demand (p = .051) such that people scoring
higher in anxiety perceived greater effort demands, but less so if they worked in pairs. The
degree of fit for this three-variable model (R = .23, R2 = .05, adj. R2 = .03, F(3, 135) = 2.40,
p < .07) was not as high as the two-variable model for EI plus the experimental condition
where the camera frames increased or decreased speed (R = .32) as reported in Section
3.1. Regression weights for the analyses of anxiety interaction effects appear in Table 9.
Table 9. Interaction effects for anxiety and working in pairs.
Criterion
Vigilance misses
Puzzle completion
TLX mental
TLX physical
TLX temporal
TLX performance
TLX effort
TLX frustration

β

0.06
−0.15
0.05
0.08
0.27
0.03
0.34
0.129

Anxiety

t

0.50
−1.41
0.35
0.58
2.13*
0.26
2.63**
1.01

β
−0.20
0.53
0.03
−0.01
0.25
0.28
0.05
0.06

Singles/pairs

t

−3.65***
7.42***
0.40
−0.16
3.09**
3.36***
0.58
0.75

Interaction

β
−0.07
0.16
0.08
0.00
−0.12
−0.00
−0.25
0.12

t

−0.58
1.42
0.64
−0.01
−0.95
−0.01
−1.97.a
0.92

No interaction effects were found between EI and working in pairs with miss errors
on the security camera (R = .33, R2 = .11, adj. R2 = .09, F(3, 131) = 5.50, p < .01), puzzle
completion (R = .56, R2 = .31, adj. R2 = .30, F(3, 130) = 19. 82, p < .001), mental demands
(R = .18, R2 = .03, adj. R2 = .01, F(3, 131) = 1.47, NS), physical demands (R = .14, R2 = .02,
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adj. R2 = .00, F(3, 131) = 0.82, NS), or performance demands (R = .41, R2 = .16, adj. R2
= .14, F(3, 131) = 8.59, p < .001). However, interaction effects were found for temporal
demand, effort demand, and frustration. Regression weights for the EI interaction analyses
appear in Table 10.
Table 10. Interaction effects for emotional intelligence and working in pairs.
Emotional intelligence
Singles/pairs
Criterion
Vigilance misses
Puzzle completion

0.31
0.30

TLX effort
TLX frustration

−0.62
−0.61

TLX mental
TLX physical
TLX temporal
TLX performance

−0.39
−0.48
−0.62
0.42

β

0.96
1.05

−1.15
−1.42
−1.90.a
1.34
−1.91.a
−1.79.a

t

t

β
0.52
0.90

0.55
1.09

−2.50
−1.76

−2.64**
−1.78.a

−1.46
−1.53
−1.97
0.72

−1.48
−1.54
−2.09*
0.78

Interaction

t

β
−0.89
−0.39

−0.90
−0.45

2.67
1.89

2.70**
1.83.a

1.58
1.58
2.33
−0.44

1.54
1.52
2.36*
0.46

The results for the main effects for temporal demand showed that people who
scored higher in EI experienced less temporal demand as did those who worked in pairs.
Those who scored higher in EI and worked in pairs, however, experienced a greater
temporal demand. The accuracy of this three-variable model (R = .34, R2 = .11, adj. R2
= .09, F(3, 131) = 5.52, p < .001) was equivalent to the two-variable model reported
containing anxiety plus working in pairs (R = .33) reported in Section 3.1. A graph of the
relationships that was generated from the unstandardised regression weights is shown in
Figure 4. It is noteworthy that twice as many people in the study worked in pairs as worked
alone.
Figure 4. The effects of the interaction between EI and working in pairs on temporal demand generated
from unstandardised regression weights.

Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2015): pg. 20-52. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Taylor & Francis.

29

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be accessed by following the
link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

The main effects and interaction effect for effort demand showed a similar pattern
of regression weights. The accuracy of this three-variable model (R = .32, R2 = .10, adj. R2
= .08, F(3, 131) = 5.05, p < .01) was again equivalent to the two-variable model containing
EI and task speed presented first (R2 = .32). A graph of the relationships that was
generated from the unstandardised regression weights is shown in Figure 5; working in
pairs was apparently more demanding than working alone.
Figure 5. The effects of the interaction between EI and working in pairs on effort demand generated
from unstandardised regression weights.

The main effects and interaction for frustration showed the same pattern that was
found for temporal demand and effort demand. The accuracy of this model (R = .16, R2
= .03, adj. R2 = .00, F(3, 131) = 1.20, NS) was not as high as the prediction from anxiety
alone.

4. Discussion

Several important points were learned pertaining to the TLX subjective ratings of
workload, the four principal constructs, and the effect of working alone or in pairs. Each is
discussed in turn below and followed by suggestions for future research on individual
differences and cognitive workload.

4.1. TLX

All TLX scales except physical demands were affected by individual differences in
either anxiety or EI. The two constructs work together psychologically such that anxiety
predisposes the individual to higher levels of arousal to a given stimulus or situation.
Persons scoring higher in EI are more likely to recognise the effect and should engage some
internal coping strategy to get arousal under control. Load is a source of stress; recognising
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the presence of stress is the first step toward nullifying its negative effect on one's
immediate work activities if not also for longer term well-being.

Physical demands from the experimental tasks were actually very low. Most
participants said so on the TLX rating, but a few gave some highly unrealistic ratings. The
unrealistic ratings could have been produced by lack of any anchors other than ‘very low’
to ‘very high’ at the opposite poles. They could also have been examples of rating errors
that are commonly known in person perception and performance evaluation, which are
halo, central tendency, and leniency or severity error (Guion 1998). However, it does not
appear that these types of error have been explored in ratings of task workload. Leniency
or severity error seemed to be the most apparent of the three types of rating errors in the
case of physical demands. Leniency or severity error occurs when a rater rates all people,
tasks, or objects too far to the high or low end of the scale. Although it is not easily
discernible from halo error in the present situation, some participants did indeed provide
unrealistically high ratings for physical demands, which were in turn correlated with
ratings of mental demand, temporal demand, and frustration. The findings thus indicate the
need for anchors, although anchors might be difficult to generalise from one application to
another. Fortunately, the impact of leniency or severity error can be negated in studies that
compare tasks or system designs. By matching ratings of multiple objects by one person,
only the differences between the ratings register as the experimental effect.
The study provided some opportunity to explore the connection between the TLX
and task performance in light of the dissociation reported in earlier studies. As it turned
out, TLX scales were not associated with performance on the vigilance task. However, two
scales, performance pressure and physical demands, were correlated with puzzle
completion. The effect for physical demands was actually a suppressor effect that corrected
for leniency or severity error.

4.2. Speed order effects

Some participants started with the slower condition and worked up to the faster
condition, and others started with the faster condition and slowed down. The speed order
condition only affected one TLX scale – perceived effort. Perceived effort was rated lower
by those who started in the faster condition and then slowed down. Cox-Fuenzalida et al.
(2004) explained a similar result as speeding up requiring a greater adaptive response,
which challenged people higher in anxiety more so than others. Szalma and Taylor (2011)
appeared to arrive at a similar conclusion regarding the relationship between stress,
coping, and anxiety.
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The study by Szalma and Teo (2012), however, would suggest that the critical
points for producing adaptive responses to a workload that is too slow and one that is too
fast are asymmetrical; critical points in both directions would be found if the conditions
were fast enough or slow enough. At the same time there are dissociations between
perceived load and performance and between speed and accuracy that need to be studied
further.

However, an alternative explanation for the speed order effect obtained here is that
the participants were experiencing a recency effect. Fast-first would mean that the slower
speed was more readily remembered when the ratings were given. Similarly slow-first
would mean that the faster speed was more often remembered. The ambiguity between the
two interpretations of the results would need to be investigated further.

4.3. Working in pairs

The experimental condition involving two participants working together on the two
tasks was expected to lower the perceived workload under the thinking that ‘many hands
make light the work.’ However, that is apparently not what happened. Instead, higher
ratings of performance pressure and temporal demands were associated with working in
pairs. Ratings of mental workload, perceived effort, and frustration were generally not
affected by the manipulation, but there was some apparent impact of working in pairs on
effort and frustration when interactions between EI and working in pairs were considered.
Apprehension about performance evaluations and social facilitation could have influenced
the results of the present study, and further research is needed to examine the possibilities.
The best means for determining a group workload from individual ratings is
currently an unresolved issue (Funke et al. 2012). The present findings suggest that a
complication exists that needs to be resolved in future research on group workloads.
Factors such as the mere presence of other people and apprehension about performance
evaluation or social facilitation for getting the job done could influence physiological,
subjective, and behavioural indices of group workload as they might have done in the
present study. For the time being we learned that people higher in EI experience greater
temporal demand, effort demand, and frustration when working with a co-worker. The
specific nature of interactions that produces the effect is not known, but possibilities
include the added effort to synchronise work performance with the co-worker
(coordination cost), to counteract perceived social loafing, or to adjust to an individual that
is perceived as dominating.
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It is also possible that the structure of the tasks could be an overriding determinant
of how individual workloads compile into group workloads. Tasks that allow a greater
number of degrees of freedom for switching off tasks among individuals might afford
greater elasticity in response to workload changes. Bottlenecks within the group's
workflow, however, could be a source of rigidity. The tasks performed in the present study
were not susceptible to either influence because the participants were instructed that they
were both responsible for both tasks, and they worked in parallel rather than in a serial
process.

4.4. Psychosocial variables

Four variables were hypothesised to contribute to the subjective ratings of
workload and performance. Anxiety displayed a connection to ratings of temporal demands
and frustration such that anxious people gave higher ratings on both TLX scales. The latter
connection was consistent with Cox-Fuenzalida et al. (2004) and Rose et al. (2002).
Anxious people thus seemed more sensitive to time pressure. However, their anxiety or
experience of frustration did not appear to impact their task performance, in contrast to
Cox-Fuenzalida et al. (2004). The anxiety–performance connection, or apparent lack of the
same, is consistent with the previous research showing that anxiety can have both positive
and negative effects on performance; so the net effect observed here was no effect (Ein-Dor
et al. 2010). The high-anxiety participants could have been exerting compensatory efforts
as Matthews et al. (2000) and Szalma (2008) might suggest, or the dual-task situation
provided enough mental workload to negate the effects of anxiety by not allowing mental
time for non-task ruminations, as Vytal et al. (2012).

EI displayed an effect on ratings of mental demand, performance pressure, and
effort, where participants scoring higher on EI gave higher ratings on all three TLX scales.
They seemed to be more sensitive to the situational demands and possibly their own
responses; this interpretation would be consistent with the basic definition of EI (Mayer
and Salovey 1997). EI had a direct positive relationship with puzzle completion, but not the
vigilance task. The reason why EI would impact on one task and not the other is not
forthcoming from the data, but one might speculate that tasks that are more engaging, or at
least higher load, would trigger the EI characteristic more so than less engaging or lower
load tasks, because more mental effort would go into self-regulation of emotions such as
the experience of stress and boredom. An alternative speculation that is perhaps more
germane to the dual task is that the participants quickly figured out that they would be very
bored with watching security screens without interruption and occupied themselves
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effectively with the other task that they were assigned. At the same time they did not allow
their personal reactions to interfere with the vigilance tasks.

Conscientiousness was unrelated to ratings of subjective workload. It played a small
role in the performance of the vigilance task where people scoring higher in
conscientiousness missed fewer targets. This finding was consistent with Rose et al.
(2002). In light of the nature of the construct, which featured attention to details, and its
long-run history as a predictor of work performance in many contexts, this result was not
surprising. Conscientiousness had a small bivariate correlation with puzzle completion, but
this effect was redundant with other predictors of puzzle completion in the multiple
regression model.

The separation of conscientiousness into two scales produced some nominal effects
for vigilance, puzzle completion, and performance demands. However, the separation made
a marked improvement in the explanation of temporal demands. The participants who
perceived greater demands were more controlled on the one hand, but less attentive to
details on the other. Those who perceived lighter temporal demand were more attentive to
detail but more impulsive.
PWE was also unrelated to the subjective measures of workload except frustration.
The multiple regression analysis, however, showed that its effect on frustration was
redundant with a larger effect associated with anxiety. Although it was correlated with
both performance criteria in the multiple regression analyses, the effect was the opposite
of what would be expected based on the nature of the construct. Participants who scored
higher in PWE actually accomplished less of the puzzle and made more errors on the
vigilance task. An explanation for these inverse relationships was not forthcoming from the
data, but one might speculate that (1) it was actually capturing a tendency to
overcompensate for mediocre diligence or attention focus, (2) it reflected the
independence aspect of PWE, (3) the construct does not have the same relevance it might
have had 30–40 years ago. Explanation (1) could be the result of the correlation found
between anxiety and PWE. According to Furnham (1990), Buchholz's (1977) scale and
other versions of PWE that he studied were consistent with the PWE construct. The
internal consistency of measure used in this study was low and might be related to simply
having too few items or not enough variability in the responses from the participants.
Longer scales might be more helpful in future research on PWE in ergonomics.
Meanwhile, one impetus for studying PWE in the 1970s was the folk observation
that PWE was no longer the dominant belief system about work. Perhaps PWE has become
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an acquired taste for many people in the twenty-first century. If one feature of the PWE is
to find value in work even if it is boring or tedious and perform it better or longer
(Greenberg 1977), it would follow that the self-regulation of emotion and behaviour that
appears implicit in PWE would not have been learned. Further study of PWE could be of
interest, although many of the concomitant issues would stray beyond the present concern
for individual differences in cognitive workload and other aspects of system design,
especially for products that are leisure oriented and not necessarily work oriented.

5. Conclusions and future directions

The results of the present study allowed for the following conclusions:

1. Subjective measures of cognitive workload are influenced by at least a few
individual differences. The two more prominent ones were anxiety and EI.
2. Subjective ratings of cognitive workload, specifically the TLX scales, are subject to
classic forms of rating bias, most notably leniency–severity error.
3. Of the six TLX scales, performance demands, which captures a characteristic of the
individual rather than the task itself, was the scale most proximally related to
performance on one of the tasks, but not the other.
4. Individuals who worked in pairs experienced greater temporal demand and
performance pressure compared to those who performed the two tasks alone.

Some specific recommendations for future research that were suggested already can
be re-aggregated with further ideas:
1. Researchers who intend to use TLX for evaluating system configurations should
consider adding anchors to remove the equivalent of halo or leniency–severity
errors in ratings. Alternatively, experimental designs should be adopted that could
also negate the bias problem, such as designs that compare a set of within-person
ratings given to a series of conditions. The drawback of that technique is that in
some cases stopping the work process to give ratings could interrupt the cognitive
flow that is taking place as working conditions are subtly changing. The rating
activity could induce a task-switching cost.
2. The four psychosocial variables studied here should be revisited in other contexts
where different task and stress demands are involved. The nexus of anxiety, EI, and
frustration appears particularly promising, and those constructs should be explored
further. The present study did not explore interactions among the constructs
because doing so would involve a large number of two-, three-, and four-way
interactions that could not plausibly produce a generalisable pattern. However,
future studies could consider interactions among some possible combinations of
variables. Within the non-linear dynamics context (cusp catastrophe) that
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3.
4.

5.
6.

generated the elasticity–rigidity construct, the elasticity or rigidity variables do not
actually interact with each other; they interact with initial performance levels, thus
producing trajectories over time.
The schism between variables affecting workload perception and those affecting
performance could be explored with a wider variety of data. More emphasis should
be given to coping strategies that people might use to counter overload and
underload conditions or motivational aspects of the work situation (e.g. Hancock
1996; Hancock and Warm 1989; Szalma 2008).
The processes by which individuals’ subjective ratings are affected by group
dynamics is a wide open area for study. Non-linear dynamical processes,
particularly those linked to behavioural synchronisation, have been implicated on
multiple occasions (Cooke et al. 2012; Funke et al. 2012; Stevens et al. 2013) and
speak to the level of complexity that is probably involved in the individual-to-group
process. As an example, there is probably some question as to whether the dyads in
the present study were really teams or just nominal dyads. The participating
individuals did not have a prior history of working together, but the instructions
were given to encourage team efforts. The informal observations of their talk, or
lack of the same, however, indicated that varying levels of coordinated task
engagement and interpersonal cohesion were taking place.
The counter-intuitive connection between PWE and performance warrants further
research. The independence trait or facet of PWE could be a viable candidate for
further study as well.
The psychosocial variables that were explored in the present study were scouted for
possible further connections to the principle of elasticity or resilience. In order to
test elasticity explicitly, the mathematical models shown in Figure 1 and an analysis
thereof would be required along with behavioural indicators of workload effects
that are measured at two or more points in time. The two cusp catastrophe models
proposed earlier (Guastello, Boeh, Shumaker et al. 2012; Guastello, Boeh, Schimmels
et al. 2012; Guastello, Boeh et al. 2013) would also allow for the separation of
workload and fatigue effects, which were potentially conflated in subjective scales
the way they are usually used.
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